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I. Introduction
After the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in the
fall of 1989, a new political joke began to circulate through the region.
It went as follows: What is the definition of socialism? It is the longest
road from capitalism to capitalism. The thesis of this paper may strike
t Research Fellow, International Business and Trade Law Programme. MA., Econom-
ics, Queen's University at Kingston, 1990; LL.B., University of Toronto (expected 1994). The
author would like to thank Professor Michael Trebilcock for his helpful comments on earlier
drafts.
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some readers as being equally absurd. This thesis is that the shortest
road from a centrally planned economic system to some form of capi-
talism is via another form of socialism-market socialism.
The form of market socialism that this Article advocates is a system
of worker-owned firms as opposed to a system of decentralized public
ownership. The introduction of market forces into a system of public
ownership has already been tried in Eastern Europe and has been an
unambiguous failure.' This form of market socialism no longer has
any political support in these countries, even though innovative new
versions of it continue to be proposed by some Western intellectuals.2
By contrast, as will be discussed in the first part of this paper, the
verdict on the performance of worker-owned firms in Eastern Europe
is not yet in. As a result, the idea of worker ownership appears to be a
popular one and is an important element of several privatization
schemes that are currently being implemented.3 "Privatization," in this
sense, is compatible with market socialism as it refers to the creation of
property rights in a firm and their transfer to its employees.4
Influential Western business periodicals have denounced the idea
of privatization through worker ownership on the grounds that "mar-
kets need capitalists."5 Some professional economists agree, claiming
that "[i]f employee-owned firms become the dominant form of owner-
ship .... their deficiencies, known from property rights and agency
theory, will leave a strong imprint upon their performance-and on
that of the economy as a whole."6 Yet, as this Article will argue in Part
III, economic theory does not prove that such firms can never work.
Instead, the literature suggests that worker-owned firms have both ad-
vantages and disadvantages relative to capitalist firms.7 Furthermore,
this Article will show that in the context of Eastern Europe's economic
transition, many of the long-run problems of worker ownership are
short-run virtues. Worker ownership may therefore outperform capi-
talist ownership during the transition period, and, later, when the eco-
nomic climate has stabilized, possibly be replaced by it.
However, the most decisive arguments in favor of worker owner-
1 See Janos Kornai, The Affinity Between Ownership Forms and Coordination Mechanisms:
The Common Experience of Reform in Socialist Countries, 4J. ECON. PERSP. 190 (1990).
2 See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan &John E. Roemer, Market Socialism: A CaseforRejuvenation, 6
J. EcoN. PERSP. 101 (1992).
3 See infra notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
4 If the transfer results in only employees holding equal shares in the firm, a pure
worker cooperative has been created. However, many other forms of worker ownership are
also possible, including those which bring no control whatsoever, e.g., American employee
stock ownership plans (ESOPs). SeeJon Elster & Karl Ove Moene, Introduction to ALTERNA-
cTvEs TO CAPrrALIsM 1, 22-25 (Jon Elster & Karl Ove Moene eds., 1990).
5 A Survey ofPerestroika, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 1990, at 13 [hereinafter Perestroika].
6 Jan Winiecki, Privatization in East-CentralEurope: Avoiding Major Mistakes, in THE EMER-
GENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASrERN EURoPE 271,273 (Christopher Clague & Gordon C.
Rausser eds., 1992) [hereinafter MARKET ECONOMIES].
7 See infra notes 62-93 and accompanying text.
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ship may not be economic, but political. The interactions and possible
contradictions between democracy at the level of the firm and at the
level of the polity are examined in Part IV. While both sides of the
political debate over democratic worker control greatly exaggerate the
way it might differ from capitalism, few have considered the role that it
might play in assuring the transition to political democracy. Yet, it is
this interaction between economic and political forces that may make
the strongest case for giving worker ownership a large role in Eastern
Europe's privatization plans.
H. Worker Ownership in Eastern Europe
A. Current Proposals for Reform
Any claim on behalf of some form of socialism as a solution to the
economic problems of Eastern Europe is likely to encounter a high
degree of (justified) skepticism. After all, the people of this region
have made it abundantly clear that they no longer want to be guinea
pigs in a grand social experiment. As one commentator has said:
That the absurdist aspect of contemporary Western academic dis-
course about economic systems is lost on its practitioners is convinc-
ingly confirmed by the most recent issue of the journal, Ethics, in
which a group of Western academics gravely discusses various aspects
of market socialism-a conception exposed to universal derision in
the transitional societies of the post-communist world where it
originated decades ago. The contributors to Ethics might have done
better to discuss the prospects of the restoration of [the] monarchy in
Russia-far less of an exercise in anachronism and conceivably a topic
of some interest to those whose fates it might affect.8
Yet, this reaction to market socialism is misguided with respect to both
the origins of the idea and its prospects in contemporary Eastern
Europe.
First, the vision of an economic system made up of worker cooper-
atives dates back to long before the breakdown of central planning in
Eastern Europe. It was popular during Karl Marx's lifetime, but he
thought little of it and called its supporters "Utopian socialists."9 This
label is doubly misleading. Not only is the idea distinctly non-utopian,
it may not even be socialist. Leading liberal philosophers, from John
Stuart Mill to John Rawls,10 have also been attracted to it.
Second, and more importantly, this vision currently has significant
political support in the former Eastern Bloc. Worker ownership is an
important part of recent privatization legislation in the region. For
example, Russia's privatization scheme has three parts that can be
8 John Gray, Against the New Liberalism, TIMEs LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, July 3,1992, at 13,
14.
9 JosEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HIsToRY OF ECONOMIC ANALYsis 455 (1954).
lo John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Briefer Restatement 146 (1990) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with author) (citing JOHN S. MiLL, PRINciPLEs OF PoLmCAL ECONOMY Bk. IV,
ch. 7).
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loosely described as follows: (1) corporatization; (2) choice of em-
ployee ownership plans; and (3) stock purchase plans."
In the first step, taken in July 1992, large- and medium-sized enter-
prises were corporatized by establishing boards of directors on which
workers sit alongside management and government officials. 12 This
step was a prerequisite to privatization because Russian firms formerly
existed merely as units of the central plan and had none of the normal
methods of corporate control.13
In the second step, the new companies could choose between two
proposals. Under the first of these proposals, workers would be given
twenty-five percent of the company's non-voting shares and an option
to buy ten percent of voting shares at a thirty percent discount. Man-
agers would then receive an option on five percent of the shares and
the remaining sixty percent would be sold to the public.1 4 The second
proposal would involve even greater worker control. It would allow
workers to buy fifty-one percent of assets at 1.7 times their book value
as of January 1992.15 The premium above book value was probably
meant to reflect the fact that assets appreciate over time and are usu-
ally worth more than their historical cost (a questionable assumption
in the Russian context).
The third step of the scheme, taken in October 1992, involved the
distribution to all citizens of tradeable vouchers that could be spent at
auctions of stock in newly privatized enterprises. Citizens who did not
want to buy stock could sell their vouchers for cash. 16 Not only did this
third step broaden the political support for privatization, but it also
created a liquid market in the shares that workers received during the
second step of the process. 17
Admittedly, Russia's program involves more worker ownership
than that of other former Eastern Bloc countries. Aside from Russia,
Poland has the most powerful lobby for self-management, due to the
role of Solidarity in bringing about the events of 1989.18 Yet, despite
Solidarity's efforts, proposed legislation grants Polish workers only ten
percent of the initial share distribution, with no further option to
buy.' 9 In other countries, worker participation plays no part in the
share distribution process, even though workers are granted represen-
tation on some corporate boards.20
11 Russia Under the Hammer, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, at 69.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note 6, at 273.
19 Stanley Fischer, Privatization in Eastern European Transformation, in MARKET ECONO-
MIES, supra note 6, at 227, 236.
20 Id. at 234.
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Although a wide political consensus in favor of worker ownership
has not yet emerged, Russia's plan nonetheless clearly demonstrates
that there is a significant constituency supporting it. Furthermore,
even where workers are not given an initial share distribution, they can
achieve de facto control by bidding their vouchers on their own firms.
The wide dispersion of share ownership means that such worker
buyouts will be frequent.21 Early anecdotal reports even suggest that
some Russian workers are bidding on firms in which they already have
a controlling interest.22
The Russian plan also illustrates how the standard approach to
mass privatization can be easily modified so as to create a large sector
of worker-owned firms. The standard approach involves the quick sale
of small enterprises to the private sector, combined with a distribution
or sale of vouchers for stock in the "core" medium- and large-sized
companies. 23 Some role is also played by holding companies or mu-
tual funds. 24 Although these mass privatization plans have had some
problems (such as vouchers not indexed to inflation), 25 they have al-
lowed thousands of firms to be privatized at a rate much higher than
that of the traditional single firm auction approach. 26
B. The Histoy of Worker Control in Eastern Europe
The Russian privatization plan is not the first experiment with
worker control in the former Eastern Bloc. One form of privatization
has already been tried, beginning with the Yugoslavian reforms of the
1960s. The disastrous Yugoslavian experience of debt and stagflation 27
was repeated in Poland and Hungary in the early 1980s after attempts
at decentralization led to a similar system.28 This common experience
21 See Voucher Power, in A Survey of Business in Eastern Europe: Don't Give Up Now, ECONO-
MIST, Sept. 21, 1991, at 64 (supp. at 20) (citing Dusan Triska of the Czech Ministry of
Finance).
22 Sweet Factory Sold Off, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Dec. 10, 1992, at B2.
23 Fischer, supra note 19, at 229-237.
24 Id. at 239-41. The Hungarian "bottom-up" approach is an exception to this form of
privatization. See id. at 237-38. Of course, Germany is also a special case. See Norbert Horn,
The Lawful German Revolution: Privatization and Market Economy in a Re-unified Germany, 39 AM.
J. CoMp. L. 725 (1991); Michael J. Thomerson, German Reunification-The Privatization of So-
cialist Property on East Germany's Path to Democracy, 21 GA.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 123 (1991). The
rapid pace of events means most analyses are now somewhat obsolete, but for details on
various pieces of legislation, see Vladimir K. Andreev, Privatization of State Enterprises in Russia,
18 RExv. Carr. & E. EuL L. 265 (1992); Symposium, Trade and Foreign Investment in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, 24 VAND. J. TRANSN'L. L. 205 (1991).
25 Maxim Kniazkov & Olga Onishchenenko, Ruble Madness: Playing the Russian Stock Mar-
ke GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Oct. 1, 1992, at A27.
26 Russia Under the Hammer, supra note 11, at 70.
27 See Saul Estrin, Some Reflections on Self-Management, Social Choice, and Reform in Eastern
Europe, 15J. CoMp. ECON. 349, 352 (1991).
28 Manuel Hinds, Issues in the Introduction of Market Forces in Eastern European So-
cialist Economies (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Hinds' analysis is
also adopted by Perestroika, supra note 5.
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may be one reason why some reformers have assigned worker owner-
ship only a minor role in existing privatization plans.
In Yugoslavia, workers possessed ownership rights in their firms,
but these rights were nontransferable. This created perverse incen-
tives, such as short time horizons leading to under-investment.2 9 Given
that the condition of their firm after their own retirement was of no
interest to them, workers heavily discounted the future benefits of
most investments.
In Poland and Hungary, the state retained nominal ownership fol-
lowing the reforms, but de facto control passed to managers and work-
ers.30 This ownership structure, combined with prospects of upcoming
layoffs and restructuring, only magnified the same perverse incentives
as existed in Yugoslavia. One observer described the process as follows:
Workers and state managers, freed from communist suppression, col-
lude to raise wages and salaries sufficiently to absorb the cash flow of
the enterprise, absorbing profits, depreciation funds and so on. Since
there are no real representatives of capital income at the firm level,
the process runs virtually unabated .... 1
These problems were compounded by the process of "spontaneous"
privatization in which self-dealing managers sold the firm's assets to
foreigners or entered into joint ventures with them. Such transactions
were quite common in Hungary, 32 where they called the entire reform
process into question.
Some observers have concluded that the disastrous performance
of state enterprises governed by workers and managers is proof of the
failure of market socialism.38 Yet, such conclusions draw the wrong
lessons from Eastern Europe's recent experience. The failure of the
self-management system had two main causes-one political, the other
economic. First, there continued to be a high degree of state interven-
tion as governments were empowered to intervene in every aspect of
economic life.3 4 The system thus bore greater resemblance to a
planned economy than to a market one. Second, ownership rights
were either nontransferable or nonexistent. No one, not even work-
ers, genuinely owned the firms.
Conclusions based on Eastern Europe's recent experience ignore
the difference between a system in which workers control assets owned
by the state and one in which they are owners themselves. Markets do
need active owners, but why can't these owners be workers? It also is
important to emphasize that the imposition of a single ownership
structure is not being advocated in this Article. Under a privatization
29 OLIVER BLANcHARD ET AL., REFORM IN EAsTERN EUROPE 52 (1991).
30 Perestroia, supra note 5, at 14-15.
31 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Privatization in Russia: Some Lessons from Eastern Europe, 82 AM. ECON.
REV. 43, 44 (1992).
32 BLANCHARD ET AL., supra note 29, at 33.
33 Hinds, supra note 28.
34 Estrin, supra note 27, at 349.
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scheme such as the Russian one, workers may begin with both owner-
ship and control, then give up control and retain ownership as in an
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), or then completely sell out to
a private investor or pursue a number of other alternatives.
Furthermore, worker ownership in Russia appears to have had a
more promising track record than in other parts of Eastern Europe,
although its history is much shorter. The first elements of worker self-
management were introduced by Gorbachev's Law on State Enterprise
of 1987, but these were mostly window dressing and did not change
the structure of the command economy. 35 The Law on Cooperatives
of 1988 was a more fundamental relaxation of state control36 and even
observers skeptical of worker ownership saw it as an improvement:
"Despite the difficulties, the new businesses are thriving. In the first
half of 1989 the total number of cooperatives in the Soviet Union al-
most doubled, from 78,000 to 133,000 .... So, by any standard, Mr.
Gorbachev's law on cooperatives has been a greater success than his
law on state enterprises."37
Unfortunately, the uncertain legal status of most cooperatives,
combined with their need to purchase inputs from state enterprises,
meant that many of them "operated on the borderline of illegality"
and made their profits through superior access to state-produced
goods.38
True worker ownership in Russia only began in 1990 when enter-
prises were allowed to opt out of the state plan if worker collectives
purchased their assets.39 It is too early to systematically assess the per-
formance of these firms, but the anecdotal evidence suggests that
many have experienced significant increases in productivity.40 Conse-
quently, it appears that sweeping judgments about the failure of coop-
erative-based market socialism in Eastern Europe are unwarranted.
M. The Economics of the Firm and the Economic Transition
A. The Strategy of Economic Transition
Before discussing the economic merits of worker ownership, it is
important to set the issue of privatization in the broader context of the
debate over the appropriate speed of economic reform. Economic
opinion on this issue is spread out along a continuum with those who
35 PADmA DESAJ, PERESTROIKA IN PERSPEcnvE 32-34 (1989).
36 Id. at 38-40, 58-59. Cooperatives were also allowed to issue shares and enter into joint
ventures. Id.
37 Perestroika, supra note 5, at 12.
3 Id.
39 John Logue & Dan Bell, Worker Ownership in Russia, 1992 DISSENT 199, 200.
40 See generally id. (providing anecdotal evidence on two large manufacturing firms).
The Moscow taxi fleet is discussed in JAcoB KEREMETSKY &JOHN LOGUE, PERESTROIKA, PRIVA-
TIZATION AND WORKER OwsERSIP IN THE USSR 34-37 (1991).
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advocate a "cold shower" approach (such as a rapid move to a free
market) at one end 4' and those who would take a slow evolutionary
approach at the other.42 While many argue for rapid reform on some
issues and slower progress on others,43 a review of the more extreme
opinions is the best way to understand the issues at stake.
1. The "Cold Shower" Approach
Among the advocates of the "cold shower" approach, Jeffrey
Sachs, an advisor to both the Polish and Russian governments, is per-
haps the best known. According to Sachs, the reform process is a
"seamless web":
Structural reforms cannot work without a working price system; a
working price system cannot be put in place without ending excess
demand and creating a convertible currency.... At the same time,....
the macroeconomic shock must be accompanied by other measures,
including selling off state assets, freeing up the private sector, estab-
lishing procedures for bankruptcy, preparing a social safety net and
undertaking tax reform. Clearly, the reform process must be
comprehensive. 44
Sachs supplements this economic case for rapid reform with a variety
of political arguments. He notes the danger of populist pressures if
results are not seen quickly and points to the inability of the bureau-
cracy to correct any market failures.45
Privatization plays a key role in the "cold shower" approach for a
number of reasons. First, it is one way of hardening the "soft budget
constraint" of inflationary state subsidies.46 Second, it is a necessary
condition for firms to stop asset-stripping and to react efficiently to
market signals. 47 Sachs realizes that the existing ownerless enterprises
are not genuine cooperatives. Yet, he argues that privatization should
aim only at creating private corporations on the grounds that
"[w] orker-managed firms (except for small-scale, labor-intensive opera-
tions) put workers at excessive risk and cut the firms off from the capi-
tal markets, because outside investors know that the workers can vote
to pay themselves higher wages out of the company's profits."48 Conse-
quently, Sachs is only prepared to countenance allowing workers a to-
ken share of the company's stock and some representation on its
41 See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., BLANcHtARD, supra note 29, at 50 (arguing for rapid privatization, but slower
restructuring).
44 David Lipton & Jeffrey Sachs, Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of
Poland, 1990 BROOIrNGS PAPERS ON ECON. Acmvrsv 75, 99.
45 Id. at 87-88.
46 The term "soft budget constraint" captures the myriad ways in which prices, taxes,
and credit are manipulated under central planning to subsidize firms. See Perestroika, supra
note 5, at 14.
47 Lipton & Sachs, supra note 44, at 101.
48 Id. at 128.
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board of directors.49
2. The Evolutionary Approach
Other observers of the transition process are much less sanguine
about the possibilities of rapid reform. For example, Janos Kornai,
who agrees with all of Sachs' substantive proposals, 50 believes that a
dual economy will nonetheless persist for two decades.5 1 Others warn
that "an unfettered market process could lead to too many bankrupt-
cies and too much labor shedding" and therefore advocate temporary
tariff protection. 52
Peter Murrell goes even further in criticizing the "cold shower"
approach. 5 3 According to Murrell, this emphasis on improving incen-
tives is a misdiagnosis of the problems of centrally planned econo-
mies. 54 In his opinion, uncertainty and the limits of economic agents'
information-processing abilities lead even capitalist firms to react
much more slowly to new incentives than neoclassical theory
predicts.5 5 As a result, the true advantages of a market system over
planning do not stem from superior incentives but from the pressures
to adapt created by free entry and exit. These pressures counteract the
inertial tendencies of large organizations and force them to search for
better technologies. 56 The problems of Eastern Europe are thus
mainly due to a lack of innovation (dynamic inefficiency) rather than a
lack of allocative (static) efficiency.
The main policy implication of this theory is that we should ex-
pect a high degree of persistence in organizational behavior, even after
changes in ownership. Murrell warns:
Whereas in the long run a market system might be the most produc-
tive economic environment, in the short run, when routines and ex-
pectations are still adapted to the bureaucratic environment of central
planning, a swift changeover to the market could be ver destructive of
the capacity of the existing firms to produce output.57
Therefore, instead of the "cold shower" approach, he prefers a gradual
phasing out of state control combined with a policy fostering the devel-
opment of new private sector firms.5
8
What are the implications of the evolutionary view for privatiza-
tion? Given the inertia of firm behavior, Murrell believes that "too
49 Id.
50 Janos Komai et al., Comments and Discussion, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. Acrv.
rrv 138 (discussing Lipton & Sachs, supra note 44).
51 JANos KoRNA, THE ROAD TO A FREE ECONOMY 101 (1990).
52 BLANCHARD Er AL., supra note 29, at 93-94.
53 Peter Murrell, Evolution in Economics and in the Economic Reformn of the Cmtrally Planned.
Economies, in MARKET ECONOMIES, supra note 6, at 35.
54 Id. at 38.
55 Id. at 38-39.
56 Id. at 40.
57 Id. at 42.
58 Id. at 43-46, 52.
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many hopes have been invested in privatization and rather too much
intellectual, social and political capital is being consumed in the pro-
cess. . . ."59 Furthermore, Murrell points out that existing organiza-
tions may have efficiently adapted over time to their economic
environment.60 Changing the ownership structure may only waste ex-
isting organizational capital without providing any knowledge about
how to function in a new environment. Thus, due to the slow entry
and growth of more efficient firms, a dual economy is desirable during
the transition period. 61
B. The Behavior of the Worker-Owned Firm
The preceding discussion indicates how the idea of worker owner-
ship is attacked from both sides of the debate over the speed of eco-
nomic reform. On the one hand, those advocating the "cold shower"
approach fear that these firms will undertake too little investment and
even engage in decapitalization due to the short time horizons of work-
ers or their inability to borrow. They also fear that workers will bear
too much risk. Most importantly, they worry about a sluggish response
to the new price signals created by rapid reform.
Partisans of the evolutionary approach, on the other hand, view a
slow response to new incentives either as desirable or inevitable. How-
ever, they see little benefit in any form of rapid privatization and worry
about its potential costs. Instead of privatization, they stress the need
to improve organizational efficiency and innovation via the entry of
new firms. From this perspective, capitalist firms are seen as survivors
of a natural selection process that weeds out inefficient organizations,
so that any attempt to foster cooperatives would be futile and succeed
only in slowing down the growth of innovative new firms. Thus, the
evolutionary approach adds objections related to organizational ineffi-
ciency to those based on capital market problems and labor adjust-
ment issues.
1. Capital Market Problems
There is a long strand of economic literature arguing that worker-
controlled enterprises can never succeed without state assistance. 62
According to this view, worker-owned firms differ from traditional capi-
talist firms because they adopt the objective of maximizing net income
per worker instead of profits.6 3 Workers are assumed to take no direct
interest in the value of the firm as opposed to the income that it gener-
59 Id. at 45.
60 Id. at 50-51.
61 Id. at 52.
62 Perestmika, supra note 5, at 13, provides an exceptionally clear statement of this view.
63 Id. The literature making this assumption is surveyed in Alan Hyde, In Defense of Em-
ployee Ownership, 67 Cs.-KENT L. REv. 159, 166-167 nn.19-22 (1991).
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ates. Moreover, even this interest in future income is heavily dis-
counted since workers cannot cash in on the value of their firm when
they leave. As a result, the firm will suffer from a horizon problem in
which workers vote to increase wages at the expense of investment.64
If workers are then allowed to borrow, this problem of underinvest-
ment turns into the opposite problem of choosing excessively capital-
intensive techniques. 65 Workers will borrow as much as they can be-
cause the assets from their investments can later be drained to pay
higher wages. Fortunately, outside investors will realize that such firms
have poor prospects and will refuse to provide them with additional
funds, unless they receive very high interest rates (or they are
subsidized) .66
The only place in the world where worker-controlled firms actu-
ally behave like this is Eastern Europe. The empirical literature on
employee-owned firms in the West does not reveal similar horizon
problems: if anything the opposite is true.67 While worker-controlled
firms in the West are relatively rare, those that do exist appear to be
fairly stable and can sometimes attain large sizes.68
Why do we see such a difference between East and West? One
possibility is that Western cooperatives seek to maximize their "income-
employment security" instead of net income and are thus more far-
sighted.69 Eastern European firms by contrast, faced with the possibil-
ity of massive restructuring, are caught in an "end period" problem, 70
and thus their employees are grabbing what they can before the firm
goes under.
However, a more important explanation of this difference seems
to be the role of capital markets in the West. While their Eastern Euro-
pean counterparts draw upon subsidies from state banks, Western
worker-controlled firms must borrow at competitive rates from private
banks or issue nonvoting equity through public offerings (if control is
to be retained).71 They are therefore likely to bear the costs of any
opportunistic behavior.
Some commentators worry that external financing is difficult to
obtain for worker-controlled firms and have proposed ingenious alter-
64 Perestroika, supra note 5, at 13.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Oumership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE LJ. 1749, 1774 (1990).
68 Hyde, supra note 63, at 168.
69 This assumption is suggested by Hajime Miyazaki & Hugh M. Neary, The //yrian Firm
Revisited, 13 BELLJ. ECON. 259 (1983) (cited in Hyde, supra note 63, at 167 n.22).
70 A situation in which future gains are heavily discounted and therefore do not provide
strong incentives.
71 In the real world, as opposed to some economic models, employees can and do sell
shares in any form they like. For example, Weirton Steel has diluted the level of worker
ownership through public offerings. See Hyde, supra note 63, at 168 n.23.
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natives. One such scheme would "establish tradeable nonvoting equity
shares that would be purchased by each worker as he or she joins the
enterprise and owned or sold by each worker as he or she leaves the
enterprise."72 However, the difficulties of obtaining external finance
should not be exaggerated. As Howse and Trebilcock point out, "since
workers are fixed as well as residual claimants on the firm, they are
likely to favor less risky investments than non-worker shareholders."73
Consequently, the agency costs of debt are lower for a worker-con-
trolled firm than for a capitalist one. Unfortunately, the converse of
this proposition is that the pool of equity finance is likely to be limited
to low risk/low return investors.74
Howse and Trebilcock also raise the possibility that employees
may "choose to vote themselves higher salaries rather than paying divi-
dends to shareholders or reinvesting profits to maintain and enhance
the value of the firm and hence its capacity to make good on both the
claims of debtholders and majority shareholders." 75 Although such
problems may be particularly severe in the Eastern European context,
they do not appear to be insoluble. For example, majority sharehold-
ers may be deemed to owe a fiduciary duty of fairness to the minor-
ity.76 A mechanism similar to the oppression remedy of corporation
statutes in some jurisdictions could also deter some forms of opportu-
nistic behavior. 77
Finally, it is always possible for workers in a newly privatized coop-
erative to abandon control either by having the shares held in trust (as
in an ESOP) or simply by selling out to a private investor. If such an
investor could indeed manage the firm more efficiently, he or she
should be able to buy out the workers and the effect of the initial free
offering of shares would be purely redistributional. By contrast, credit
rationing and collective action problems may make it difficult for work-
ers to buy out their company even if it would be efficient for them to
do so.
2. Labor Market Adjustment Issues
Assuming that the problems of capital accumulation and financ-
ing are soluble, there is still a danger that worker ownership could
actually hurt the very people it is meant to help. One mechanism
through which this may happen is workers' risk aversion. The other is
72 Thomas E. Weisskopf, Challenges to Market Socialism: A Response to Critics, 1992 DISSENT
250, 256 (citing Gregory Dow, Control Rights, Competitive Management, and the Labor Manage-
ment Debate, J. COMP. ECON. 10 (1986)).
73 Robert Howse & Michael J. Trebilcock, Protecting the Employment Bargain, 43 U. To-
RoNTo LJ. (forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 55, on file with author).
74 Id. at 56.
75 Id. at 57.
76 See, e.g., Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969).
77 See, e.g., Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O., ch. B.16, § 248 (1990).
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the possibility that worker ownership will create labor market rigidities
and thereby increase unemployment. As we shall see, the two issues
are in fact related.
Even staunch defenders of worker ownership concede that "risk
aversion is the single greatest problem with employee ownership and
the single greatest obstacle to its wider spread."78 This problem is two-
fold. First, employees are bundling their risks in one type of invest-
ment instead of spreading their assets. Second, and far more serious,
the return on employees' shares is highly correlated with that of their
firm-specific human capital. 79 In other words, if a worker-owned firm
goes bankrupt, employees not only lose their jobs, they also lose their
savings.
In the Eastern European context, the first aspect of this problem
is likely to be negligible since capital markets are not sufficiently devel-
oped to allow full portfolio diversification. Though this may become a
more serious problem in the future, the more immediate fear is that
restructuring will leave a large part of the working class unemployed
and holding on to worthless shares. It is easy to imagine the poten-
tially disastrous social and political effects of such an outcome.
If worker ownership reduces the likelihood of unemployment,
however, the risk allocation argument against it loses some of its force.
As Howse and Trebilcock point out,
where the risk of displacement is high, the future fixed claim on the
firm... may need to be heavily discounted. This explains why, pre-
cisely when they are most in risk of losing their jobs, workers may ex-
change future wage concessions for share ownership. If the firm fails,
they are likely to lose both their fixed and residual claims. If the wage
concessions do in fact succeed in turning the firm around, then work-
ers will have managed both to reduce the riskiness of their future fixed
claim on the firm, as well as to make a profit on the shares.8 0
Therefore, the question of risk allocation is intimately connected to
the employment effects of worker ownership.
One of the strangest predictions of the early literature on the
worker-controlled firm was that it would respond perversely to changes
in demand, cutting back its workforce when demand increased so that
the remaining members could enjoy higher incomes. 8' The introduc-
tion of more realistic behavioral assumptions, such as equal treatment
of all members, has led to the more plausible result that worker-con-
78 Hyde, supra note 63, at 205-206.
79 This distinction between different problems associated with risk averseness is made in
the context of Britain's privatizations by Paul A. Grout, Employee Share Ownership and Privatisa-
tion: Some Theoretical Issues, 98 ECON. J. 97, 104 (Supp. 1988).
80 Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 73, at 62.
81 Karl Ove Moene, Strong Unions or Woker Control?, in ALTERNATIVES TO CArrAUSM,
supra note 4, at 85. Empirical evidence confirms this result. See Ben Craig & John Pencavel,
The Behavior of Worker Cooperatives: The Plywood Companies of the Pacific Northwest, 82 Am. ECON.
REv. 1083, 1089 (1992) (finding that U.S. cooperatives are more inclined to reduce pay than
employment).
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trolled firms will be slower both to cut back and to increase their
membership.82
To a true believer in the "cold shower" approach, this rigidity in
hiring and firing would be a fatal flaw as it would slow down the re-
structuring process. However, anyone willing to recognize even slight
imperfections in the labor market will see this as a positive aspect of
worker-control. In the short run, for any number of reasons, the wages
paid by capitalist firms tend to be rigid and excessive unemployment
results. Moreover, such unemployment can be highly persistent 83 and
can have pernicious social and political consequences. Of course, new
entrants into the labor force will have to rely more on expanding pri-
vate firms, but the benefits of slower labor shedding during the transi-
tion process more than compensate for these costs and those created
by inefficient risk allocation.
3. Organizational Efficiency
Partisans of the evolutionary approach may applaud the labor
market inertia of worker-owned firms, but they may point out that ex-
isting state enterprises are also likely to shed labor slowly. Why waste
time privatizing such firms when this time could be spent fostering the
growth of new private sector enterprises? Also, why risk destroying the
still valuable organizational capital of the state firms?
Neither of these objections should deter partisans of worker own-
ership. First, as we have seen, the process of privatization through
worker ownership would be fairly simple, politically feasible, and inex-
pensively accomplished. 84 Second, to the extent that existing firms
possess valuable organizational capital, privatization through worker
ownership should preserve it. Workers, unlike other owners, have sub-
stantial information about past practices and should be able to sustain
any efficient norms of cooperation that emerged under central
planning.
Perhaps one reason that the evolutionary approach has thus far
neglected the worker ownership option may be its belief that capitalist
firms are the result of a Darwinian process that weeds out inefficient
firms. After all, if worker cooperatives are so good, why don't we see
more of them? This point has been made in the Eastern European
context by Janos Kornai: "[W] hile third forms (cooperatives, self-man-
agement and associative coordination) existed even at the peak of bu-
reaucratic centralization, these forms did not experience a spectacular
growth after the command system had been abolished. When forms
other than centralized state-ownership were permitted, private owner-
82 Moene, supra note 81, at 86-87.
83 B.ANCHAD ET AL., supra note 29, at 85.
84 See supra notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
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ship gained ground rapidly."85 This fact is particularly embarrassing to
proponents of worker ownership because in this case the "third forms"
appear to have started on an equal footing with private ownership.
The analogy between the social process of competition and the
natural process of evolution, however, should not be pushed too far.
Humans, unlike animals, are capable of strategic behavior that leads to
suboptimal equilibria. The existence of mass unemployment during
recessions is perhaps the most persuasive evidence of such suboptimal
outcomes in capitalist economies. Yet, worker ownership may help to
reduce unemployment by eliminating one of its most important
causes, namely, the asymmetries of information that make firms pay
"efficiency wages" that are above the market-clearing equilibrium.8 6
The theory of efficiency wages begins by considering the problem
of "shirking"-a catchall term that refers to a worker's reluctance to
increase work effort, reveal information to management, or take any
other action that might enhance productivity. A capitalist firm, being
unable to monitor its workers directly, may attempt to pay a wage pre-
mium in order to induce higher productivity.8 7 The premium is
designed to make any worker caught "shirking" pay a penalty in lost
wages. Unfortunately, as all firms in an industry adopt this practice,
the wage premium disappears. Yet, because all firms are now paying
higher wages, their demand for labor has decreased and unemploy-
ment has been created. 88 The risk of unemployment then plays the
deterrent role for which the wage premium was intended. By contrast,
as Alan Hyde has argued, the worker-owned firm's self-monitoring in-
ternal organization eliminates the need to pay such efficiency wages
and thereby also eliminates their perverse consequences.8 9
Some commentators are skeptical that cooperatives can solve the
"shirking" problem that leads capitalist firms to pay efficiency wages.
For example, Howse and Trebilcock suggest that professional manag-
ers will have to be introduced to deter "shirking."90 But this then
raises the classic question of who will monitor the manager. Is the only
solution to make the monitor a residual claimant, as Alchian and Dem-
setz91 argue? If so, is the evolutionary view of capitalism correct after
all?
There are two reasons why we should not give up on cooperatives
so easily. First, the Alchian and Demsetz "solution" does not work for
the large, widely held corporations in capitalist countries. In most of
85 Kornai, supra note 50, at 144.
86 Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline De-
vice, 74 Am. ECON. REv. 433 (1984).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Hyde, supra note 63, at 176-78, 20001.
90 Howse & Trebilcock, supra note 73, at 60.
91 Armen H. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).
1993]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
these firms, managerial pay is only weakly related to firm perform-
ance.92 Second, if workers have had sufficient time to adapt to team
behavior, they may be able to sustain a cooperative equilibrium based
on self-monitoring instead of monitoring by a residual claimant.93
Thus, worker control may bring substantial benefits by slowing la-
bor shedding and improving organizational efficiency. Its disadvan-
tages in terms of possible capital accumulation problems, risk aversion,
and sluggish hiring will be felt mostly in the long term, by which time a
sector of privately owned firms will have developed. The fundamental
questions about worker ownership are therefore more political than
economic.
IV. The Politics of the Firm and the Political Transition
A. Worker Ownership and Democracy
Most of the ardent supporters of worker ownership base their case
on political reasons rather than economic ones.94 As Alan Hyde ex-
plains, in this political science literature "[a] standard trope is the al-
leged disjuncture between the economic and political realms.
Democracy is justified for reasons standard in political theory since Ar-
istotle .... The employee owned firm is painted very vaguely, but
prominent in the palette are tones of participation and responsive-
ness."95 Obviously, only firms that are worker-controlled will have
democratic features, mere ownership without control (as in an ESOP)
is not enough to create economic democracy.
The political arguments in favor of worker control are often very
moving. Writers in the neo-Marxist tradition, such as Bowles and Gin-
tis, eloquently describe the aspect of domination and dependency in-
herent in the employment relationship. 96 Jon Elster has also argued
that economic democracy favors active self-realization over the passive
consumption of capitalism.97
Although there is certainly a good deal of truth to the neo-Marxist
analysis of capitalism, its characterization of worker ownership has a
somewhat utopian flavor. First, most successful worker cooperatives
place restrictions on the extent to which workers can participate in the
decision-making process. In fact, Hansmann's survey of cooperative
92 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives,
98J. POL. EcON. 225 (1990).
93 Bentley MacLeod, Behaviour and the Organization of the Firm, II J. COMP. ECON. 207,
219 (1987). MacLeod's game-theory analysis of monitoring costs proves that the Alchian-
Demsetz solution has only limited applicability. Surprisingly, the extensive literature survey
in Hyde, supra note 63, omits this result.
94 The literature is surveyed in Hyde, supra note 63, at 165 n.17.
95 Hyde, supra note 63, at 165.
96 SAMUEL BowLEs & HERBERT GINTIs, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: PROPERTY, COMMU-
Nrrv AND THE CON'rAnicriONS OF MODERN SoCGAL THOUGHT 64-91 (1986).9 7 Jon Elster, Seif-realisation in Work and Politics: The Marxist Conception of the Good Lfe, in
ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALISM, supra note 4, at 127.
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governance indicates that "worker ownership generally serves just to
insure that a firm's workers as a whole are not exploited by the firm,
and not to provide a means for truly effective worker participation and
representation."98 Second, cooperative choices will still be constrained
by market forces, so that the democratic decision procedure may make
little substantive difference. Of course, these facts only mean that the
political benefits of economic democracy are somewhat muted, not
that they are nonexistent.
At the other end of the political spectrum, one finds arguments
that any form of collective ownership will threaten political democracy.
For example, Friedrich Hayek writes:
It is now often said that democracy will not tolerate "capitalism." If
"capitalism" means here a competitive system based on free disposal
over private property, it is far more important to realize that only
within this system is democracy possible. When it becomes dominated
by a collectivist creed, democracy will inevitably destroy itself.99
If by "collectivism" Hayek means central planning, he is probably right.
But why should a competitive system of worker cooperatives threaten
democracy? Hayek claims that democracy must be limited "to fields
where true agreement exists,"100 otherwise the range of issues to be
decided will be so broad that democracy will become unstable and
eventually collapse. 1 1 In a planned system, the consequences of such
a collapse are very serious. In a decentralized system, however, the
worst that can happen is that democracy will collapse at the level of the
firm, not the polity.
According to Henry Hansmann, the inherent instability of demo-
cratic decision making is the Achilles heel of worker ownership.
Hansmann believes that worker-owned firms may bring substantial pro-
ductivity gains and that the problems of capital accumulation and risk
bearing are relatively minor.'0 2 Yet, he argues that worker ownership
will only succeed when there is a substantial homogeneity of worker
interests so that the costs of decision making are low.' 0 3
Hansmann's theory of worker ownership is somewhat puzzling.
On the one hand, he argues that most cooperatives place some limits
on worker participation to minimize the costs of decision making.' 0 4
On the other hand, he claims that the problems created by conflicts of
interest among workers are usually insoluble. It is not clear, however,
why the limits on participation that do exist are insufficient. Further-
98 Henry Hansmann, Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO LJ.
(forthcoming 1993) (manuscript at 17, on file with author) (emphasis added).
99 FRMDRIcH A. HAW, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 69-70 (1944).
100 Id. at 69.
101 This argument is presented in the language of public choice theory in DAN USHER,
THE ECONOMIC PREREQuisrlE TO DEMOCRACY (1981).
102 Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work?, supra note 67, at 1773.
103 Hansmann, Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, supra note 98, at 11;
Hansmann, supra note 67, at 1784.
104 Hansmann, Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, supra note 98, at 17.
1993]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
more, simple conflicts of interest, as between workers and managers,
are not enough to create voting cycles or other forms of instability.
This will only occur where conflicts of interest are sufficiently complex.
The validity of Hansmann's claims are ultimately an empirical
matter. Yet, as Hyde points out, most of the literature on worker own-
ership "does not suggest that devising internal governance structures is
the big deal that Hansmann makes it."l05 Another weakness cited by
Hyde is Hansmann's failure to study Italian cooperatives, one of the
few groups in the West large enough to be used for convincing com-
parisons. 10 6 Such a study has been recently undertaken by Saul Es-
trin.10 7 He finds that while labor management skews employment in
favor of the blue collar workers that are the median voters, it does not
harm productivity or growth.' 08 Consequently, the collective choice
problems created by democracy in the workplace do not appear to be
serious enough to outweigh its benefits in terms of equality and self-
realization.
B. Worker Ownership and the Politics of Transition
Even if a system of worker ownership was unambiguously desira-
ble, the issue of how to move to such a system would still remain.
Though the political changes in Eastern Europe may present a unique
opportunity to introduce worker ownership on a wide scale, there are
two complicating factors. The first relates to the fairness of the initial
distribution of shares. The second relates to the interactions between
a move to worker ownership and the viability of the region's fragile
political democracies.
1. The Fairness of Worker Ownership
Even economists who believe that worker-owned firms can be effi-
cient often oppose them on the grounds that it would be unfair to give
existing workers special claims on a firm's assets. 109 For example, Stan-
ley Fischer asks: "[W] hy should industrial workers obtain larger claims
on capital than workers in less capital-intensive industries, such as
teaching? Or, why should workers in successful firms become wealth-
ier than those in less successful firms?" 110 This is perhaps the most
powerful objection to privatization through worker ownership and at
the very least a reason for distributing a noncontrolling share of stock
equally among the rest of the population.
105 Hyde, supra note 63, at 170 n.35.
106 Id. The other large groups of cooperatives are in Spain and the northwestern United
States. On the former, see HENK THOMAS & CHRIS LOGAN, MONDRAGON: AN ECONOMIC ANA-
vsis (1982). On the latter, see Craig & Pencavel, supra note 81.
107 See Estrin, supra note 27.
108 Id. at 364-65.
109 BLANcHcAR ET AL., supra note 29, at 51-54.
110 Fischer, supra note 19, at 230.
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Given that the efficiency aspects of worker ownership remain un-
certain, the ultimate decision must be made on grounds of fairness.''
There are two reasons, however, for which the issue of fairness is not
settled by granting an equal initial distribution of shares. First, workers
in highly capital-intensive industries may bear the brunt of economic
restructuring. Teachers, to use Fischer's example, do not seem to be
facing the possibility of mass layoffs. Ideally, only those workers that
become unemployed would receive state assistance, but the cash-
starved governments of Eastern Europe are unlikely to implement gen-
erous welfare programs in the near future. Second, there may be a
trade-off between horizontal and vertical equity. To the extent that a
worker-owned firm grants its employees a claim on its net income, the
distribution of total income in society may be more egalitarian than
under capitalism. Given that income redistribution through a welfare
state is not in the cards, worker ownership may be the only means of
realizing a relatively equitable society.
2. Worker Ownership and the Democratic Transition
The ultimate success of the reform process will depend on its
political effects as well as its economic ones. The perceived fairness of
the initial distribution of shares during privatization will be essential to
ensure the success of future reforms. For example, the process of
"spontaneous" privatization in Hungary imperiled the entire reform
process since it permitted members of the nomenklatura to obtain
larger profits. 112 However, there is no evidence that the majority of
the population in countries like Russia oppose the grants of shares to
workers on preferential terms. Meanwhile, the Russian plan "has al-
ready begun to drive a wedge between industrial managers-who are
often hostile to the idea-and workers, who have been largely in
favour."113
Worker control may also strengthen the new democratic govern-
ments of Eastern Europe. For example, "[b]y increasing employee
rights at the workplace and giving experience in decision making, self-
management could be an important buttress to political democracy, of
some importance in the early days of the new systems."" 4 Govern-
ments may also benefit if difficult economic decisions are perceived as
being more legitimate when they are made by workers instead of inves-
tors. Finally, workers themselves are more likely to understand the
need for painful economic restructuring when they are also owners.
111 This point is made with respect to a move from capitalism to market socialism in
JOHN EiLST, SOLOMONICJUDGEMENTS 216 (1989).
112 Fischer, supra note 19, at 237-38.
"13 Taxicabs and Trains, in A Survey of Russia: Russia Reborn, ECONOMisr, Dec. 5, 1992, at
58 (supp. at 23).
114 Estrin, supra note 27, at 353. This theme also appears in Owen M. Fiss, Capitalism and
Democracy, 13 MiCH.J. INT'L L. 908 (1992).
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This understanding and trust is crucial to the survival of democracy.
Without it, even well-intentioned governments "begin to vacillate be-
tween a technocratic style inherent in market-oriented programs and
the participatory style needed to maintain political support. These vac-
illations erode confidence in reform and may threaten democratic
stability."1 15
V. Conclusion
This Article has attempted to make the case for moving from cen-
tral planning to worker ownership. This proposal may strike some as
being a move from a discredited form of socialism to an unproven
one-yet another experiment that the people of Eastern Europe could
do without. As Vaclav Havel has written, "I don't know exactly how
anyone understands this 'third way,' ... but if it is meant to refer to
some combination of the unproven and the proven, I must place my-
self on the side of the side of those who would rather not have any-
thing to do with it."1 1 6
It is easy to sympathize with Havel's desire to live in a normal dem-
ocratic capitalist society. Unfortunately, this option is not immediately
open to Eastern Europe. Instead, the region is forced to choose be-
tween different proposals for economic reform. All of these are, to
some extent, unproven. There is as yet no tested way of moving from
central planning to capitalism. Consequently, while we should not try
to impose worker ownership, neither should we dismiss its potential.
This Article has argued that Eastern Europe's history tells us little
about how a system of worker-owned firms would behave. We must
therefore rely on economic theory. This theory suggests that worker-
owned firms may have important advantages over capitalist firms in the
short run, especially in terms of slowing labor shedding and improving
organizational efficiency. Worker control is also attractive in political
terms-partly for its potential to bring democracy to the workplace,
but mostly because it may secure democracy at the level of the polity.
Of course, it may turn out that the long-run problems of worker-
owned firms will cause the workers to sell out to private investors. If
this is true, then privatization through worker ownership will only have
delayed the inevitable. A more likely prospect, however, is that a
uniquely Eastern European version of capitalism will emerge. Like
Japanese capitalism, this system might place greater emphasis on col-
lective rewards and cooperation than the North American system. In
this case, Eastern Europe will have found its own road back from
serfdom.
115 ADAm PRzEwoRSIu, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLMCAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS
IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA xii (1991).
116 VACLAV HAVEL, SUMMER MEDITATIONS 123 (1992).
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